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Abstract— Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a vital cryptographic 
technique used for securely computing common data of different 
sets. In PSI protocols, often two parties hope to find their common 
set elements without needing to disclose their uncommon ones. In 
recent years, the cloud has been playing an influential role in PSI 
protocols which often need huge computational tasks. In 2017, 
Abadi et al. introduced a scheme named EO-PSI which uses a 
cloud to pass on the main computations to it and does not include 
any public-key operations. In EO-PSI, parties need to set up 
secure channels beforehand; otherwise, an attacker can easily 
eavesdrop on communications between honest parties and find 
private information. This paper presents an improved EO-PSI 
scheme which has the edge on the previous scheme in terms of 
privacy and complexity. By providing possible attacks on the prior 
scheme, we show the necessity of using secure channels between 
parties. Also, our proposed protocol is secure against passive 
attacks without having to have any secure channels. We measure 
the protocol’s overhead and show that computational complexity 
is considerably reduced and also is fairer compared to the previous 
scheme.  
Keywords— private set intersection, data outsourcing, privacy-
preserving protocol 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) deals with 
problems that require distrustful parties to mutually compute a 
functionality without revealing their private inputs. Over the 
past several years, there has been growing interest among 
researchers to develop generic protocols that have this feature 
to compute any function. In this way, the main concern is 
efficiency. As a result, researchers shifted their focus away 
from generic forms and considered specific functions to achieve 
far better results in terms of performance.  
One of the most important functionalities is the private set 
intersection (PSI), which enables two or more parties to find 
their common set inputs without any need to disclose their 
inputs that are not included in the intersection. Over more than 
a decade, PSI has been a very popular problem among 
researchers that also has many valuable real-world applications 
such as evaluating the efficiency of online advertising [16], 
private contact discovery [25], and location sharing [10]. 
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Consider a situation that two security agencies want to 
determine their common list of defendants. Of course, the 
trivial solution would be revealing the list of all defendants to 
each other, however, due to security issues, this is certainly not 
the case and PSI protocol can solve this kind of problem in a 
secure and efficient way.              
Although as we go further in years, better efficiency is 
obtained in PSI settings, but many of them are still nearly heavy 
to be used in a practical manner. One way to address this issue 
is to use a party, which often named a cloud server, with high 
capacity and computational power to take responsibility for the 
heavy side of the PSI computation. Computation outsourcing to 
a cloud alleviates some problems related to the traditional PSI, 
while creates some new concerns that should be regarded. 
When it comes to data outsourcing, one of the biggest 
concerns is privacy leakage. To prevent this, owners of data 
prone to somehow encrypt their private data before outsourcing. 
Thus, this often leads to huge overhead costs. In some cases, 
one trick would be using blinded private data instead of 
encrypting them. This technique can preserve the owner’s 
privacy against the cloud. With this regard, we can have 
protocols in which the cloud can process the specific operations 
on blinded data without any need to disclose them, and in the 
end, the clients by unblinding can obtain the desired results. 
A. Related work 
The first idea of PSI was presented by Meadows [2] and was 
almost based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Many years 
later, the PSI problem was defined formally by Freedman et al. 
[4] in which their protocol was mainly constructed of additively 
homomorphic encryption and the notion of oblivious 
polynomial evaluation. Afterward, a considerable number of 
papers were published drawing on the idea of [4] or other 
cryptographic concepts such as blind-RSA and unpredictable 
functions [7, 8, 9]. For years, the majority of proposed protocols 
were based on public-key setting and therefore, this resulted in 
heavy computational cost and inappropriate running time. In 
this regard, later works such as [12, 15, 18, 20] started to take 
advantage of some useful techniques and tools such as balls into 
bins method [3], bloom filter [1], and cuckoo filter [11] to 
mitigate the overhead of the PSI protocols. Scalability should 
be considered as a crucial point in PSI protocols and when it 
comes to some real-world applications such as private contact 
discovery, it is a much more serious matter. Consequently, 
some papers like [22, 26] devoted their attention to unbalanced 
  
 
PSI in which one of the parties has limited capacity and another 
one has an enormous amount of it. Recently, as a result of 
massive complexity that parties often deal with in PSI, using a 
cloud as an entity to delegate heavy PSI computation to, has 
become a popular approach among researchers. Several 
schemes have been published in this context such as [14, 17, 23, 
24]. Preserving privacy of party’s outsourced sensitive data is 
an immediate concern in cloud base related schemes and there 
should be some considerations to prevent cloud to acquire any 
additional information than it is allowed. For instance, [14] is 
not quite private and the cloud can derive some information like 
cardinality of the intersection. In 2015, Abadi et al. introduced 
O-PSI [13] where was mainly based on additively 
homomorphic public-key encryption and polynomial 
representation of sets. [13] had many advantages over other 
schemes but it suffers from huge public-key complexity. 
Therefore, in [19], Abadi et al. presented an efficient O-PSI 
scheme named EO-PSI that while keeping useful features of 
[13], did not use any public-key operations and had far better 
performance than it. 
B. Our Contribution 
In [19], the authors claimed that their protocol is secure 
against passive attacks, but they did not state using secure 
channels (e.g., TLS setting) is inevitable for providing security 
in the scheme. In an attempt to make [19] more efficient and 
practical, we propose a new scheme that is secure against 
passive attacks, while does not need any secure channels, so the 
messages can be sent over public channels. Besides, our new 
scheme has less computational complexity compared to [19] 
which plays an important role in decreasing the running time of 
the protocol. Also, in our protocol parties' costs are more 
unbiased. 
  
The rest of this paper is ordered as follows: Section II 
describes the required preliminaries for our scheme. In section 
III, an overview of EO-PSI [19] is presented. In section IV, 
some possible passive attacks on EO-PSI are discussed. Our 
new scheme is introduced in section V. Section VI represents a 
security analysis of the proposed scheme as well as a 
comparison of the proposed protocol and [19] in terms of 
complexity. In the end, a conclusion is given in section VII. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we discuss some important preliminaries 
used in this paper. We review polynomial representation of sets 
and a technique called balls into bins. Also, we revisit the 
security model of the EO-PSI. 
A. Polynomial Representation of Sets 
Representing sets by polynomials is a widely used 
technique introduced in [4]. In this representation, firstly, we 
consider a big enough finite field 𝐹𝑝 to map all the elements of 
the universe set 𝒰 , then, to represent a set 𝑆  we can define 
polynomials over the field as 𝑓(𝑥) = ∑ (𝑥 − 𝑠𝑖)
|𝑆|
𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑖  is 
a set element in 𝑆  and  |𝑆| = 𝑑 . Let 𝑓 and 𝑔  be two 
polynomials  that represent two sets 𝑆  and 𝑇  respectively, 
then gcd (𝑓, 𝑔) is the polynomial describing set 𝑆 ∩ 𝑇. In [5], 
it is proved that if 𝑟 and 𝑠 be two degree 𝑑 random polynomials 
in 𝐹[𝑥] , then 𝑓 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝑔 ∙ 𝑠 = 𝑝 ∙ gcd (𝑓, 𝑔)  in which  𝑝  is a 
random polynomial in 𝐹[𝑥]. As a result, we can indicate the 
intersection of two given sets by finding the roots of the above 
equation. To do so, we should factorize the equation and then 
consider the valid roots that corresponding to gcd (𝑓, 𝑔) and 
not  𝑝. It is worth noting that valid roots can be distinguished 
from random roots by using encoding techniques in advance [5, 
19]. 
Expressing a polynomial 𝑓(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑎𝑑𝑖=0 𝑖 𝑥
𝑖  using its 
coefficients(?⃗? = [𝑎0, … , 𝑎𝑑]), causes multiplying two degree 𝑑 
polynomials to has complexity of 𝑂(𝑑2) . A useful way to 
reduce this complexity to 𝑂(𝑑) , is to represent a degree 𝑑 
polynomial  𝑓(𝑥) by a set of 𝑛  point-value 
pairs {(𝑥1, 𝑦1), … , (𝑥𝑛 , 𝑦𝑛)}  such that 𝑛 ≥ 𝑑 + 1 , all 𝑥𝑖  are 
distinct, and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖)  for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 . In this case, 
multiplying two degree 𝑑  polynomials can be done point-
wisely. One thing to stress is that since 𝑓(𝑥) ∙ 𝑔(𝑥) is a degree 
2𝑑 polynomial, it is a need to express each polynomial at least 
by 𝑛 = 2𝑑+1 points to correctly compute the result. 
B. Balls into Bins Method 
Balls into bins method [3] is a well-known technique in 
computer science related problems. It is also used as a way to 
make PSI protocols more efficient [15,19]. Factorizing a 
polynomial is a highly computational task that intuitively its 
complexity is equal to the power of two of polynomial's degree 
being factorized. Therefore, it leads to an immense overhead 
for a 𝑐-elements set to be factorized when 𝑐 is a large number. 
In balls into bins technique, firstly, according to a particular 
hash table specification, we divide a large set to many small 
subsets, then execute the PSI protocol for each one. Let 𝐻 be a 
chosen cryptographic hash function mapping elements of the 
large set into bins numbered 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℎ  as 𝑗 = 𝐻(𝑠𝑖) . The 
output of the hash function is a uniformly distributed number in 
[1, ℎ]. Regarding Hash function features, the same elements 
mapped to the same bins. Public parameters such as hash 
function 𝐻 , number of bins ℎ, and maximum size of bins 𝑑 
should be determined in advance in a way that no overflow 
occurs in any bins.  
C. Threat Model 
The threat model in [19] is based on the semi-honest setting 
in which the static adversary presents and corrupts just one of 
the parties at the same time. In the static semi-honest model, the 
corrupted party runs the assigned algorithm exactly but 
somehow tries to get more information about the other parties’ 
inputs than is allowed. In this protocol, there are three parties 
including cloud C, client A, and client B. We consider this 
assumption that the cloud does not collude with clients. Here 
we have a functionality 𝐹 that should be computed alongside 
the protocol 𝜋 as 𝐹: 2𝒰 × Λ × 2𝒰 ⟶ Λ × Λ × 2𝒰, which three 
associated inputs and outputs relate to the A, C, and B 
respectively.  Λ  Indicates the empty string, 𝒰  indicates the 
whole set universe, and 2𝒰 indicates the power set of 𝒰. To put 
  
 
it in another way, the functionality 𝐹  gets inputs just from 
clients A and B and then outputs the outcome just to client B. 
In accordance with the definition given in [6], the security of 
the protocol 𝜋 signifies that barely input and the corresponding 
output of a party is adequate for computing whatever that party 
can compute in the protocol. The simulation model stands for 
this kind of situation. Due to space constraints, we ignore the 
details of the simulation-based proof [6]. 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EO-PSI PROTOCOL 
In this part, we revisit the EO-PSI protocol [19]. It should 
be remembered that in the EO-PSI there are three parties 
including cloud C, clients A, and client B. The goal is to find 
the set intersection of A and B with the help of C. In the end, 
the client B finds the intersection and other parties learn nothing. 
This protocol includes five steps as follows. 
1)  Cloud-Side Setup 
For a start, cloud C sets public parameters such as a big 
enough 𝐹𝑝  to map the whole universe set to, a set cardinality 
upper bound 𝑐, hash table parameters like the number of bins ℎ,      
maximum capacity of each bin 𝑑 , and a cryptographic hash 
function  𝐻 . In addition, it chooses a vector ?⃗⃗?  consists of 𝑛 
distinct elements uniformly chosen from a finite field 𝐹𝑝 , 
where 𝑛 = 2𝑑+1. Besides, the cloud chooses a pseudorandom 
function 𝑃𝑅𝐹: {0,1}𝑚 × {0,1}𝑛 ⟶ 𝐹𝑝 which pseudo-randomly 
maps an m-bit message to the finite field. 
2)  Client-Side Setup and Data Outsourcing 
Consider 𝐼 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} as a client who has a set 𝑆(𝐼) ∈ 𝒰 and 
|𝑆(𝐼)| ≤ 𝑐. Each client does as follows: 
a) Regarding to the hash table parameters, breaks down its 
set elements into ℎ bins randomly. 
        ∀𝑠𝑖
(𝐼) ∈ 𝑆(𝐼): 𝐻(𝑠𝑖
(𝐼)) = 𝑗                                     (1) 
where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 
b) Chooses a master key 𝑚𝑘(𝐼) , then ∀𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℎ 
generates ℎ pseudorandom values. 
 𝑘𝑗
(𝐼) = 𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝑚𝑘(𝐼), 𝑗)                                           (2) 
c) Checks every bin, if it occupies less than 𝑑 elements, 
uses random elements to increase it. Then performs the 
following. 
1. Represents the set corresponding to each bin by 
constructing a polynomial. 
𝜏𝑗
(𝐼)(𝑥) = ∏ (𝑥 − 𝑒𝑖
(𝐼))  𝑑𝑖=1                           (3)                   
                     𝑒𝑖
(𝐼) = 𝑠𝑖
(𝐼) 𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑖
(𝐼) =  𝑟𝑗,𝑖 
2. Computes 𝜏𝑗
(𝐼)(𝑥𝑖) at all elements 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ?⃗⃗?, ∀𝑖, 1 ≤
𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 to show the polynomial in point-value form. 
3. By generating pseudorandom values, blinds every 
value 𝜏𝑗
(𝐼)(𝑥𝑖) . To do so, uses key  𝑘𝑗
(𝐼)
that was 
generated in the past and computes 𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐼) =
𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝑘𝑗
(𝐼), 𝑖) , then computes blinded values 𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐼)
 
∀𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℎ, ∀𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛  as follows: 
𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐼)
=  𝜏𝑗
(𝐼)(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐼)
                                        (4) 
4. Sends ?⃗⃗?(𝐼) = [?⃗⃗?1
(𝐼), … , ?⃗⃗?ℎ
(𝐼)
] to the cloud. 
3)  Set Intersection: Computation Delegation 
a) At first, client B sends his ID and master key 𝑚𝑘(𝐵)  to 
client A.  
b) Client A chooses a new key 𝑡𝑘 , then ∀𝑡, 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 3 
generates three pseudorandom values 𝑘𝑡 using this key 
and ∀𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℎ computes pseudorandom values by 
each one as follows:    
     𝑘𝑡,𝑗 = 𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝑘𝑡 , 𝑗)                                                (5) 
c) Then, client A generates two pseudorandom 
polynomials  𝜔𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥)  and 𝜔𝑗
(𝐵)(𝑥)  of degree 𝑑  using 
𝑘2,𝑗  and  𝑘3,𝑗 respectively. Moreover, he uses 𝑘1,𝑗 to 
produce pseudorandom values for each bin as below: 
     𝑎𝑗,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝑘1,𝑗 , 𝑖)                                         (6) 
where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
d) By using keys that client A already has, he reproduces 
 𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)
and  𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐵)
. By evaluating each of the mentioned 
polynomials, he computes 𝑞𝑗,𝑖 , ∀𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
            𝑞𝑗,𝑖 = 𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)
∙ 𝜔𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐵) ∙ 𝜔𝑗
(𝐵)(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑎𝑗,𝑖      (7) 
e) Finally, client A sends ?⃗⃗? = [?⃗⃗?1, … , ?⃗⃗?ℎ] to B. Further, 
he sends 𝑡𝑘 as well as A’s and B’s IDs to the cloud. 
4)  Set Intersection: Cloud-Side Result Computation 
a) The cloud computes the three pseudorandom values 
𝑘𝑡 , ∀𝑡, 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 3 by using 𝑡𝑘  and then finds the 
pseudorandom values 𝑘𝑡,𝑗 corresponding to each bin. 
b) Cloud reproduces  𝑎𝑗,𝑖 ,  𝜔𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥) , and 𝜔𝑗
(𝐵)(𝑥) using 
keys derived in the prior step. 
c) By picking up previously outsourced datasets, the cloud 
computes 𝑡𝑡,𝑗 as follows: 
    𝑡𝑗,𝑖 = 𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)
∙ 𝜔𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐵) ∙ 𝜔𝑗
(𝐵)(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑎𝑗,𝑖      (8)           
d) The cloud sends ?⃗? = [?⃗?1, … , ?⃗?ℎ] to B. 
5)  Set Intersection: Client-Side Result Retrieval 
a) After receiving vectors ?⃗?  and  ?⃗⃗? , client B subtracts 
corresponding elements of latter from former and this 
results in 𝑔𝑗,𝑖. 
                    𝑔𝑗,𝑖 = 𝑡𝑗,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑗,𝑖 
                        = 𝜔𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) ∙ 𝜏𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) + 𝜔𝑗
(𝐵)(𝑥𝑖) ∙ 𝜏𝑗,𝑖
(𝐵)(𝑥𝑖)  (9) 
b) Client B interpolates polynomial devoted to each bin 
via point-value pairs (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖) and by factorizing them 
can reach the roots. Valid roots are regarded as the set 
intersection. 
IV. PASSIVE ATTACKS ON THE EO-PSI PROTOCOL 
As we mentioned before, the fact that the EO-PSI protocol 
needs secure channels between parties to preserve privacy is not 
considered by the authors. In this part, we show this necessity 
by providing three potential passive attacks on the scheme. 
1)  Obtaining 𝒎𝒌(𝑩) by an attacker in step 3.a 
In this case, according to the step 2.b the attacker can get his 
  
 
hands on kj
(B) = PRF(mk(B), j) and then regarding to step 2.c 
can find the pseudorandom values zj,i
(B) = PRF(kj
(B), i) for all 
elements in every bin. Eventually, considering outsourced 
dataset oj,i
(B)
=  τj
(B)(xi) + zj,i
(B)
, attacker easily finds the 
corresponding client B’s evaluated polynomials τj
(B)(xi) and by 
factorizing them can learn the dataset of client B. 
2)  Obtaining 𝒒𝒋,𝒊 and 𝒕𝒋,𝒊 by an attacker in step 3.f and 4.d 
In this case, the attacker can attain 𝑔𝑗,𝑖  by subtracting 
𝑞𝑗,𝑖 from 𝑡𝑗,𝑖  as 𝑔𝑗,𝑖 = 𝑡𝑗,𝑖 − 𝑞𝑗,𝑖. Therefore, by interpolating the 
corresponding polynomials using point-value pairs(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖), the 
attacker can find the clients A and B intersection dataset. 
3)  Obtaining  𝒛𝒋,𝒊
(𝑨)
 by an attacker in step 4.d 
Regarding to the values the attacker can find during the 
execution of the protocol including  𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐵)
 and 𝑡𝑘, he can derive 
other values and then by obtaining 𝑡𝑗,𝑖 in step 4.d he can attain 
𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)
. Thus, considering outsourced dataset 𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)
=  𝜏𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) +
𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)
, the attacker can find the dataset of client A. 
 
Concerning the mentioned attacks, it is a need to have secret 
channels between parties in the EO-PSI setting. In other words, 
there should be some kinds of negotiating among parties in 
advance. Using secure channels not only manifests itself in 
communication and computation complexity but also in some 
cases may lead the protocol to be impractical. 
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
In this part, we propose an improved EO-PSI scheme. 
Similar to [19], the improved scheme involves three parties 
including the client C, the client A, and the client B. At the end 
of the protocol, client B learns the set intersection of clients A’s 
and B’s datasets. The advantage of the proposed scheme over 
[19] is mainly in two cases. Our new scheme does not need any 
secure channel to be privacy-preserving. Moreover, the total 
computational complexity is reduced and there is more fairness 
in the clients’ cost than prior scheme. 
1)  Cloud-Side Setup 
     This step is the same as the first step of [19], and the cloud 
determines public parameters as before.  
2)  Client-Side Setup and Data Outsourcing 
     This step is the same as the second step of [19], except in the 
last part, blinded values 𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐼)
 are calculated as follows: ∀𝑗, 1 ≤
𝑗 ≤ ℎ, ∀𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
                    𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐼)
=  𝜏𝑗
(𝐼)(𝑥𝑖) ∙ (𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐼))−1                        (10) 
3)  Set Intersection: Computation Delegation 
a) To begin with, client B sends its ID to client A. 
b) Client A recomputes the pseudorandom values 𝑘𝑗
(𝐴)
 
using 𝑚𝑘(𝐴) as (2). 
 
Fig. 1.  Interaction between parties in the proposed scheme 
c) Client A picks a new key 𝑡𝑘1 , then  ∀𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℎ 
computes pseudorandom values as follows: 
       𝑘𝑡𝑘1,𝑗 = 𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝑘𝑡𝑘1, 𝑗)                                             (11) 
d) A constructs a pseudorandom polynomial  𝜔𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥) of 
degree 𝑑 using 𝑘𝑡𝑘1,𝑗 for each bin. 
e) By using keys that client A already has, he reproduces  
 𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)
. By evaluating each of the mentioned polynomials, 
he computes 𝑞𝑗,𝑖 , ∀𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
     𝑞𝑗,𝑖 = 𝜔𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) ∙ 𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)
                                     (12) 
f) Eventually, client A sends ?⃗⃗? = [?⃗⃗?1, … , ?⃗⃗?ℎ] and IDs to 
the cloud C.  
4)  Set Intersection: Client-Side Result Computation  
The cloud who has recorded the blinded outsourced datasets 
?⃗⃗?(𝐴) and  ?⃗⃗?(𝐵), does as follows: 
a) After receiving vector ?⃗⃗? , the cloud computes 𝑞𝑗,𝑖
′  ,
∀𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℎ, and ∀𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 as below: 
            𝑞𝑗,𝑖
′ = 𝑞𝑗,𝑖 ∙ 𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴) = 𝜔𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) ∙ 𝜏𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖)         (13) 
b) By choosing a key 𝑡𝑘2 , the cloud C produces 
pseudorandom keys for each bin, ∀𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℎ  as 
follows: 
            𝑘𝑡𝑘2,𝑗 = 𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝑘𝑡𝑘2, 𝑗)                                       (14) 
c) The cloud constructs 𝜔𝑗
(𝐶)(𝑥) using keys derived in the 
prior step then computes 𝑞𝑗,𝑖
" , ∀𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤
ℎ, and ∀𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 in the following way. 
             𝑞𝑗,𝑖
" = 𝜔𝑗
(𝐶)(𝑥𝑖) ∙ 𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐵)
                                      (15) 
d) The cloud sends 𝒒′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ = [𝒒1
′⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗, … , 𝒒ℎ
′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗]  and 𝒒"⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ =
[𝒒1
"⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗, … , 𝒒ℎ
"⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗] to client B. 
5)  Set Intersection: Client-Side Result Retrieval 
a) After receiving vectors 𝒒′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  and 𝒒"⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ , client B regenerates 
𝑘𝑗
(𝐵)
, and then  𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐵)
 using the master key 𝑚𝑘(𝐵) and 
calculates 𝑔𝑗,𝑖, ∀𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℎ, and ∀𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
             𝑔𝑗,𝑖 = 𝑞𝑗,𝑖
′ + 𝑞𝑗,𝑖
" ∙ 𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐵)
                                   (16)                            
                             = 𝜔𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) ∙ 𝜏𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) + 𝜔𝑗
(𝐶)(𝑥𝑖) ∙ 𝜏𝑗
(𝐵)(𝑥𝑖) 
b) Client B interpolates polynomial devoted to each bin 
via point-value pairs (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖) and by factorizing them 
(1) (1)
(2)
(3)
Client A Client B
Cloud
  
 
can reach the roots. Valid roots are regarded as the set 
intersection. 
 
Remark 1: Our scheme can be expanded to the multi-
clients case. We do not include it in this paper for space reasons. 
VI. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
A. Security Analysis 
We can prove that our protocol is secure according to the 
defined threat model and functionality 𝐹  in section II. In a 
secure PSI functionality, it should be impossible to learn 
anything further that is derived just by input and the 
corresponding output of each corrupted party during the 
execution of the protocol. 
The proof method is similar to what is given by [19] which 
is based on simulation proof. Here, we ignore the concrete proof 
and just intuitively show resistance of our protocol against 
eavesdropping attacks. 
1)  The client B is corrupted. 
According to (10) and (12), and because of not revealing the 
𝑚𝑘(𝐴) and 𝑡𝑘1 by client A, the adversary can only acquire the 
blinded values 𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)
= 𝜏𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) ∙ (𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴))−1  and 𝑞𝑗,𝑖 = 𝜔𝑗
(𝐴)(𝑥𝑖) ∙
𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐴)
 , where they do not leak any information about the dataset 
of the client A. 
2)  The client A is corrupted. 
In accordance with (10), (14), and (15), the adversary can 
obtain 𝑜𝑗,𝑖
(𝐵)
, 𝑞𝑗,𝑖
′ , and 𝑞𝑗,𝑖
" . Thanks to adversary’s inaccessibility 
to the master secret key 𝑚𝑘(𝐵), there is no way to compute 𝑧𝑗,𝑖
(𝐵)
. 
Hence, the adversary cannot find the dataset of client B or the 
intersection of sets. 
3)  The client C is corrupted. 
As we mentioned before, the cloud C can be corrupted by 
an adversary, however, it cannot collude with clients. So, in this 
case, due to the adversary’s inaccessibility to the master secret 
keys 𝑚𝑘(𝐴) and 𝑚𝑘(𝐵), he cannot gain the datasets of clients A 
and B. Furthermore, the cloud cannot compute the (16) and 
learn nothing about the set intersection. 
B. Performance Analysis 
      In this part, we present a performance evaluation to 
determine the computation and communication complexities of 
the proposed scheme and compare the results with the EO-PSI. 
Identical to [19], we do not take into account the pseudorandom 
function cost since it can be overlooked compared with other 
operations cost such as modular arithmetic, interpolation, and 
factorization. 
     Tables 1, 2, and 3 indicate the computation and 
communication complexities of two protocols respectively. In 
terms of computation complexity, the proposed scheme is more 
efficient than [19]. As well, clients’ computation complexity is 
more balanced. In other words, the client A’s cost is reduced 
and the client B’s cost is increased while the total complexity 
of the protocol is reduced. It is shown in [19] that if the 
maximum capacity of each bin 𝑑  is fixed, there is a linear 
relationship between the set cardinality 𝑐  and the number of 
bins ℎ. It is important to note that there is no obvious difference 
in communication complexity between two schemes, and 
indeed both of the computation and communication 
complexities are linear with the size of the dataset. 
Table 1.  Computation complexity of EO-PSI [19]. We only count the online 
phase. Using secure channels also leads to additional cost than what is 
considered in this table. 
Operation Client A Cloud Client B 
Modular Addition 2ℎ𝑛(𝑑 + 1) 2ℎ𝑛(𝑑 + 1) ℎ𝑛 
Modular 
Multiplication 
2ℎ𝑛(𝑑 + 1) 2ℎ𝑛(𝑑 + 1) - 
Interpolation and 
Factorization 
- - ℎ 
 
Table 2.  Computation complexity of our scheme. We only count the online 
phase. 
Operation Client A Cloud Client B 
Modular Addition ℎ𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑛 
Modular 
Multiplication 
ℎ𝑛(𝑑 + 1) ℎ𝑛(𝑑 + 2) ℎ𝑛 
Interpolation and 
Factorization 
- - ℎ 
 
Table 3. Communication complexity of EO-PSI [19] comparison with our 
proposed scheme. 
Protocol Client A Cloud Client B 
EO-PSI [19] 𝑂(𝑐) 𝑂(𝑐) 𝑂(1) 
Ours  𝑂(𝑐) 𝑂(𝑐) 𝑂(1) 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
With the growing rate of utilizing cloud computing as an 
important approach to solve the problem of the private set 
intersection, numerous studies appeared in recent years. In this 
paper, we scrutinized the security of an efficient delegated 
private set intersection EO-PSI [19] and pointed out that this 
protocol is vulnerable against passive attacks. We suggested a 
new scheme that has two advantages over the previous scheme. 
First, our proposed protocol is secure against eavesdropping 
attacks without needing any secure channels. Second, in our 
protocol computation complexity is reduced compared to [19] 
and costs are more balanced. 
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